In 2013 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €5 banknote.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper empirically examines the competitive strategic interaction between relationship and transaction banks. "Relationship banks" establish intense and long-term relations with their borrowers and thereby generate soft, and typically proprietary, information about the borrower that is hard to verify by other parties and subjective by nature (e.g., Stein, 2002) . "Transaction banks", in contrast, operate at arm's length, base their lending decision on credit scoring models, and do not gather soft information. Their loan officers rely on information that is verifiable by third parties and is largely financial. Hence, soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank.
We focus on the difference between firms with positive soft information and firms with negative soft information. Recent theoretical models (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Inderst and Mueller, 2007) suggest that firms with positive soft information would tend to self-select to relationship banks, because relationship banks can take the positive private signal into account in the lending decision. This creates an Akerlof-type adverse selection problem, in which transaction banks tend to receive applications from borrowers with on average negative soft information. In response, transaction banks may apply a negative adjustment to the rating of all their loan applicants. However, if they do, even borrowers with slightly negative private information may be better off obtaining a loan from a relationship bank, resulting in an even worse pool of loan applicants with respect to the private signal and so forth. Ultimately, in the absence of any offsetting factor, transactions banks would no longer participate in the market for small business loans and some positive NPV firms may no longer receive credit. The selection effect may explain why banks ultimately specialize in either relationship or transaction banking.
Furthermore, theory would predict that there are interaction effects with the degree of interbank competition. In particular, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that there are two effects. When competition is introduced, banks' marginal rents from relationship lending are smaller and each bank thus reduces its investments in soft information. However, competition affects the bank's profits from both relationship and transaction lending asymmetrically. A relationship orientation helps to partially insulate the bank from pure price competition, so that an increase in competition from other banks hurts the bank's profits from transaction lending more than its profits from relationship lending. Thus, increased competition between banks may encourage banks to shift from transaction to relationship lending.
We use a matched bank-borrower dataset of German savings banks to test these predictions.
These banks provide an ideal laboratory, as they compete with pure transaction banks, such as Deutsche Bank and with pure relationship banks, such as the large number of extremely small cooperative banks in Germany. At the same time, there is sufficient variation within the savings bank sector in the degree to which banks incorporate soft information in their lending decisions.
Most importantly, the dataset allows us to construct a proxy for the case when the private nonverifiable information about the firm was positive as opposed to when it was negative that is consistent across the banks in the sample. Using this consistent measure of soft information across banks, we show that firms are more likely to be upgraded by relationship banks. At the same time, transaction banks tend to adjust the rating downward more frequently, consistent with a broad downward ratings adjustment and adverse selection. We show that the effect is stronger for firms with weak financials and for firms that are more opaque, as for these firms positive soft information is more important compared to firms that are strong based on financials alone.
Our results regarding the effect of competition on banks' investment in soft information are also novel. We show that overall banks do tend to invest less in gathering soft information if markets are more competitive. However, there is evidence of specialization: smaller banks invest more in gathering soft information from risky borrowers, while larger banks reduce their investment.
Hence, the selection effect is more pronounced in competitive markets. We find evidence that overall investment in gathering information is not necessarily reduced as competition increases.
However, we do not observe a shift of transaction banks towards more relationship lending, as Boot and Thakor (2000) would predict. Rather, we find evidence of increasing specialization.
We argue that the selection effect is at the root of this: As relationship banks invest more in discovering hidden gems, the likelihood that a customer approaching a transaction bank for a loan is a borrower with negative private information increases, exacerbating adverse selection and making small business lending less profitable for transaction banks.
INTRODUCTION
This paper empirically examines the competitive strategic interaction between relationship and transaction banks. "Relationship banks" establish intense and long-term relations with their borrowers and thereby generate soft, and typically proprietary, information about the borrower that is hard to verify by other parties and subjective by nature (e.g., Stein, 2002) . "Transaction banks", in contrast, operate at arm's length, base their lending decision on credit scoring models, and do not gather soft information. Their loan officers rely on information that is verifiable by third parties and is largely financial.
1 Hence, soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank (Inderst and Müller, 2007) .
In this paper we focus on the difference between firms with positive soft information and firms with negative soft information. Recent theoretical models (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Inderst and Mueller, 2007) suggest that firms with positive soft information would tend to selfselect to relationship banks, because relationship banks can take the positive private signal into account in the lending decision. 2 This creates an Akerlof-type adverse selection problem, in which transaction banks tend to receive applications from borrowers with on average negative soft information. In response, transaction banks may apply a negative adjustment to the rating of all their loan applicants. However, if they do, even borrowers with slightly negative private information may be better off obtaining a loan from a relationship bank, resulting in an even worse pool of loan applicants with respect to the private signal and so forth. Ultimately, in the absence of any offsetting factor, transactions banks would no longer participate in the market for small business loans and some positive NPV firms may no longer receive credit. The selection effect may explain why banks ultimately specialize in either relationship or transaction banking.
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Furthermore, theory would predict that there are interaction effects with the degree of interbank competition. In the literature, competition has an important effect on the degree to which banks will invest in gathering soft information, going back to Peterson and Rajan (1995) . The 1 That is not to say that loan officer do never attempt to manipulate hard information (see Berg et al., 2011) .
2 More precisely, in Inderst and Mueller (2007) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) , borrowers for whom the relationship bank's information advantage is large approach relationship banks, while borrowers for whom the relationship lender's information advantage is small borrow from transaction banks. Thus, the probability that a borrower receives a loan offer from the transaction bank decreases in the information advantage of the relationship bank.
3 In the literature, one solution to the selection problem from the perspective of transaction banks is to require additional collateral from their borrowers (Inderst and Müller, 2007) . However, firms without the ability to post such collateral would still be limited to borrowing from relationship banks. In addition, transaction banks may still participate, because due to automated screening procedures they have cost advantages relative to relationship banks (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) . These cost advantages tend to be largest, however, for firms that have sound financials and less so for firms where the soft information would be an important part of the decision to grant credit (Boot and Thakor, 2000) .
literature is ambiguous as whether competition would increase or decrease banks' investment in gathering soft information. Boot and Thakor (2000) , for example, argue that there are two effects. When competition is introduced, banks' marginal rents from relationship lending are smaller and each bank thus reduces its investments in soft information. However, competition affects the bank's profits from both relationship and transaction lending asymmetrically. A relationship orientation helps to partially insulate the bank from pure price competition, so that an increase in competition from other banks hurts the bank's profits from transaction lending more than its profits from relationship lending. Thus, increased competition between banks may encourage banks to shift from transaction to relationship lending. 4 Empirically, this effect may result in a greater specialization of banks, where relationship banks increase their investment in soft information further and transaction banks reduce their investment further, exacerbating the selection effect described earlier. However, it is also possible that in more competitive markets, transaction banks also start investing more in soft information, reducing the selection effect. Bharath et al. (2007) for example show that transaction banks may invest more in soft information in order to cross-sell other information-sensitive products.
The difficulty when attempting to test these theoretical predictions is that the empirical researcher needs a measure of the private signal of the firm and must be able to ascertain whether the soft information is positive or negative. Moreover, this information needs to be consistently available for a cross section of relationship and transaction banks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to have access to data that permit us to construct such variables.
We use a matched bank-borrower dataset of German savings banks. These banks provide an ideal laboratory to test these questions, as they compete with pure transaction banks, such as Deutsche Bank and with pure relationship banks, such as the large number of extremely small cooperative banks in Germany (see Section I for more detail). At the same time, there is sufficient variation within the savings bank sector in the degree to which banks incorporate soft information in their lending decisions. In addition, we can measure direct competition to these banks well, as savings banks are restricted to operate locally only.
Most importantly, the dataset allows us to construct a proxy for the case when the private nonverifiable information about the firm was positive as opposed to when it was negative that is consistent across the banks in the sample. In our data, all banks use the same rating algorithm.
Therefore, the comparability of ratings across banks is ensured. It produces two types of credit ratings for each firm. The first consists of a financial rating that incorporates hard financial statement information on the borrower only. The second is a final credit rating for each firm.
The difference between the financial rating and the end rating reveals the non-financial soft information on the borrower that was used in the lending decision. The final rating may be higher or lower than the financial rating, which gives us information about whether the private soft information of the firm was positive or negative and how important the soft information component is for a given borrower.
Using this consistent measure of soft information across banks, we first establish that there is sufficient variation in the degree to which banks use soft information in lending decisions. As predicted by theory (Stein, 2002) and consistent with prior empirical evidence (Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005; Liberti and Mian, 2009) , smaller banks use more discretion in lending. The effect, however, is asymmetric, as predicted by the selection hypothesis. Firms are more likely to be upgraded by relationship banks. At the same time, transaction banks tend to adjust the rating downward more frequently, consistent with a broad downward ratings adjustment and adverse selection. We show that the effect is stronger for firms with weak financials and for firms that are more opaque, as for these firms positive soft information is more important compared to firms that are strong based on financials alone. Hence, ex ante, the customers of small banks appear riskier based on financial information alone.
In order to distinguish the idea that relationship banks are better at discovering hidden gems from other potential explanations for our findings (such as private benefits of loan officers), we examine whether ex post the probability of default of firms with positive soft information is higher than for other firms. Hence, we link the ex ante use of hard versus soft information by relationship and transaction banks in the lending decision to the ex post default probability of the borrower. Doing this, we do not find that firms that were upgraded based on soft information are ex post more likely to default. Hence, we can reject that loan officers simply use greater discretion to grant loans to worse customers, who provide, for example, greater private benefits to the loan officers. We also provide some evidence that the transaction banks' informational disadvantage is compensated for by greater cost-efficiency in lending.
Our results regarding the effect of competition on banks' investment in soft information are also interesting and novel. We show that overall banks do tend to invest less in gathering soft information if markets are more competitive. However, there is evidence of specialization:
smaller banks invest more in gathering soft information from risky borrowers, while larger banks reduce their investment. Hence, the selection effect is more pronounced in competitive markets. The evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical ideas in Boot and Thakor (2000) . We find evidence that overall investment in gathering information is not necessarily reduced as competition increases. However, we do not observe a shift of transaction banks 6 towards more relationship lending, as Boot and Thakor (2000) would predict. Rather, we find evidence of increasing specialization. We argue that the selection effect is at the root of this: As relationship banks invest more in discovering hidden gems, the likelihood that a customer approaching a transaction bank for a loan is a borrower with a dirty secret increases, exacerbating adverse selection and making small business lending less profitable for transaction banks.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section sketches the previous literature. Section II presents some institutional background on German savings banks. In Section III, we describe our dataset. Section IV presents our empirical results. Section V presents some robustness checks and extensions. The last section concludes.
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LITERATURE
Our paper builds on a large body of literature on the role of relationships in banking. At a general level, relationship lending theory is based on the idea that financial intermediaries have a competitive advantage in the production of information about borrowers (Boyd and Prescott, 1986 ). In particular, Cole et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2005) show that smaller banks have stronger borrower relationships than larger banks due to a smaller number of managerial layers between the loan officers and the bank management in small banks (Stein, 2002; Williamson, 1967) . Liberti and Mian (2009) provide evidence that the greater the hierarchical distance, the less the importance of soft information on the borrower in the process of credit approval. Thus, smaller banks are better in producing soft information on the borrower than larger banks thanks to their organizational structure.
Most of the previous literature on bank-borrower relationships focused on their implications for the borrowers. Berger and Udell (1995) show that stronger relationships lead to lower collateral requirements and lower interest rates charged. Berger et al. (2005) and Cole et al. (2004) also show that smaller banks lend to more opaque clients while large banks focus on large firms with good accounting records. In addition, stronger bank-borrower relationships may increase the availability of credit for the borrower (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995) even in situations of rating downgrades (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998) . Jiménez and Saurina (2004) show that stronger bank-borrower relationships increase the willingness to lend to riskier borrowers.
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In much of the previous empirical literature, soft information is not directly observed and instead indirectly approximated. For instance, Cerqueiro et al. (2011) investigate the importance of discretion in loan rate setting. They use a heteroscedastic regression model to see which factors determine the dispersion in banks' loan rates to SMEs. 6 There are three recent notable exceptions that have access to a direct measure of soft information like this paper. One, use very detailed data from one bank and show that only soft information is explaining observed loan officer discretion. In addition, soft information is found to be important to determine the loan volume. This paper differs from in that we are able to analyze the selection of borrowers to relationship and transaction banks, respectively, because we have consistent data on the use of soft information for a cross section of banks.
Second, Puri et al. (2011) use retail loan applications and find that loan applications, that were rejected based on financial credit scoring, are more likely to be approved based on soft 8 information in the case of existing borrowers and those of lower credit quality. In this paper, we rather use data on the role of soft information in commercial borrower loan decisions. It is possible that the production of soft information is more important for this type of borrower given the higher degree of information asymmetry between bank and borrower. 7 The third paper is less related to our research question. Brown et al. (2012) analyze the role of loan officer discretion in credit assessment at nine banks. They show that loan officers use their discretion to smooth a borrower's credit rating. However, their smoothing behavior is unlikely to be driven by soft information.
7 Our paper also relates to the literature on the relation of size and risk. Especially in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the debate about divestures of banks into smaller operational units in order to reduce risk was prominently pursued. The main focus so far has been on the effect that larger banks increase risk because of explicit or implicit public guarantees ("too big to fail") due to moral hazard (Merton, 1977; Bhattacharya et al., 1998) . According to theory, large banks, which are perceived as "too big to fail", are more likely to be bailed-out and have therefore incentives to increase risk. These predictions have been empirically tested by many studies. For instance, Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Gropp et al. (2011) find evidence for a positive correlation between size and risk. In addition, most papers point towards higher failure probabilities at larger banks (e.g., De Nicoló, 2001).
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Germany is an ideal laboratory to study the questions of this paper. Taken as a group, savings banks in Germany have more than Euro 1 trillion in total assets and 22,000 branches. German savings banks focus on traditional banking business with virtually no off-balance sheet operations. 9 Their main financing sources are customer deposits, which they transform into loans to households and firms. They do not compete with each other, as a regional separation applies: each savings bank uniquely serves its local market (similar to the geographic banking restrictions that existed up to the 1990s in the U.S.). Finally, the savings banks make use of a relatively similar compensation system for loan officers, which largely rely on fixed contracts. 10 In our dataset, the median commission payments over regular staff expenses, which approximate the loan officer bonus payments, is only around 2%. It thus seems very unlikely that any of our results are driven by loan officer incentive issues.
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Savings banks in our sample are on average relatively profitable in the observation period 2002- borrowers. 12 The ratings are based on an internal and proprietary rating algorithm. All savings banks use the same rating algorithm, therefore the comparability of the rating is ensured. It produces a score from 1 to 21, where 1 equals AAA, 2 equals AA+, etc. until 21 equals C. Thus, the higher the numerical rating, the riskier is the borrower. The rating information is split into two components. The first consists of a financial rating that incorporates hard financial statement information on the borrower. The data also contain a final credit rating for each firm.
The difference between the financial rating and the end rating reveals the non-financial soft information on the borrower that was used in the lending decision such as management quality, the firm's strategy, and perceived product or service quality. We interpret this difference as a private signal that the borrower can send to a relationship bank but not to a transaction bank.
Depending on whether the deviation from the financial rating is negative or positive, i.e. the end rating is higher or lower than the financial rating, we use this as a proxy for a firm's private information that is positive or negative and only observable to the bank to the degree it invests in gathering soft information.
We construct five different variables based on the rating information: i) the absolute difference between the financial and the end rating; ii) the probability of a rating upgrade because of the soft information; iii) the probability of a rating downgrade because of the soft information; iv) the strength of the rating upgrade in numerical rating notches; v) the strength of the rating downgrade in numerical rating notches. Hence, in the empirical analysis below we can distinguish between downgrades based on soft information and upgrades based on soft information, which enables us to explicitly test for borrower selection based on privately 12 observed soft information. Our dataset also enables us to link the use of soft information with ex post defaults to address any biased use of soft information by loan officers
In principal, the difference between the financial rating and the end rating may reflect three different items : (i) private hard information from the transaction accounts of the firm and its owner. This information is not publicly observable, but verifiable by senior management.
(ii) Soft information that is not verifiable by senior management. (iii) Loan officer discretion. In the following we assume that relationship banks and transaction banks do not differ in the ability to take (i) into account and use the terms "soft information" and "discretion"
interchangeably. This approach is supported by the findings in , who show for very detailed borrower information from one bank in Argentina that only non-verifiable soft information but not verifiable hard information guide loan officer discretion.
Merging borrower level with the bank level dataset comes at a cost: in order to ensure some degree of anonymity of customers, the matching of borrowers to savings banks is possible only aggregated in groups of 5-12 savings banks. In total, there are 62 savings bank groups with rating data available. The aggregation was done by the savings banks association and savings banks of the same region were lumped together, except, that larger savings banks were put into large bank groups. This helps in preserving enough heterogeneity with respect to average bank group size. Hence, while we have precise information on the individual bank and on the individual customer, we only know that the customer banked with any one of the group.
In the previous literature, bank size is found to be a good indicator for tighter bank-borrower relationships (Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005) . Berger et al. (2005) show that large banks tend to approve or reject loan applications primarily via credit scores, entirely based on financial information. Potential soft information on the borrower is not taken into consideration. The explanation is that, if the number of hierarchy levels between the loan officer and the management is larger, decisions of the scoring system are overruled more often in management decisions or loan officers have fewer incentives to gather the soft information (Liberti and Mian 2009 ). The more branches for example a bank has, the more disperse its geographical footprint and the farther the physical distance between the individual loan officers and the bank's management.
13
We use three measures for bank size: the natural logarithm of the average bank assets per group of savings banks, the number of bank branches, and the number of bank employees in terms of full time equivalents (FTE). Assets are very common in the literature and well-suited as they are relatively stable and not as much affected by the business cycle as a bank's revenues or profits.
However, when measuring the strength of a relationship between a bank and a borrower (Williamson, 1967; Liberti and Mian, 2009) , another appropriate measure might be the number of branches or the number of employees of each savings bank. We throughout report results based on the bank assets and use the other two size measures as robustness checks. All results go through independently of the size measure used.
A further variable of particular interest in this paper is competition. As we emphasized in section I, savings banks are regionally restricted in the operations. Hence, we can control for the regional level of competition (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005) by using the ratio of branches of direct competitors (commercial banks and cooperative banks) to savings banks branches per group of savings banks and year in their region. 14 The data comes from the Bundesbank.
We also use other regional control variables. The number of mergers for the savings bank per year is intended to control for weakening bank-borrower relationships in the wake of a merger (Di Patti and Gobbi, 2007) . 15 We also control by the average debt per capita of the community that the savings bank is located in. With this variable we attempt to control for heterogeneity in local public finances, which may be reflected in the operations of the local banks. The variable comes from the federal statistical office of Germany ("Destatis").
An important advantage of the dataset is the possibility to relate the ex ante financial risk and ex post defaults of the banks' commercial loan customers. We have two measures for a borrower's ex ante financial risk: One, the financial rating described above, which does not include the adjustment for soft information. Second, we use an Altman-type (1968) Z-Score, which is calibrated to the German market (Engelmann et al., 2003) . A higher Z-Score indicates a lower risk associated with the borrower. For all commercial loan customers in the data we also have an ex post default measure, which equals 1 if the firm repaid principal or interest more than 90 days late in the 12 months after the credit rating was assigned and 0 otherwise. We also control for borrower size (natural logarithm of total assets), as Stanton (2002) shows that managers are more efficient in monitoring fewer large loans. Furthermore, soft information should be more important for opaque firms. We use the borrowers' legal form to distinguish between closely held firms (OhG, Personengesellschaft) and incorporated firms (GmbH, AG etc.), as closely held firms have much lower accounting and accounting standards. We use a dummy variable,
Opaque borrower, that equals 1 for the former and 0 for the latter type of firms.
14 "Region" here refers to a county ("Kreis") or a municipal area ("Stadt").
15 However, Berger et al. (1998) provide evidence that reduced small business lending is offset by the reactions of other banks.
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We also control for changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. We use the relative change in the ifo-Index, which is a nation-wide forward-looking business climate index of the ifo institute. We also employ the average daily risk-free interest rate at the national level (Bundesbank data), in order to control for the relationship between interest rates and credit risk as there is a growing body of literature showing that low short-term interest rates may be related to softer lending standards and increased risk taking (Ioannidou et al., 2009; Jiménez et al., 2011) . Please refer to Table 1 for all variable definitions.
[ Table 1 ] Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables. We first discuss variables, which are on the borrower level. The average absolute change in rating based on soft information on the borrower is 2.02 notches, which indicates a significant influence of soft information on the final rating decision. Upgrades, i.e. the final rating, indicate a lower risk due to soft information than the financial rating, are observed with a frequency of 25% and have an average magnitude of 2.48 numerical rating notches. Downgrades are more frequently observed with 60% and on average slightly less strong with 2.37 notches. The rating remains unchanged for 15% of the borrowers. The average Z-Score for the borrower is 3.41 while the average financial rating is 12.4 (corresponding to a long-term credit rating of BB). Both measures approximate financial risk from an ex ante perspective. On average, 4.8% of the borrowers in our sample default in the 12 months following the rating assignment. Sorting upgrades based on the financial rating reveals that upgrades are more likely for very risky ratings because these would not have received loan offers without positive soft information. We observe the reverse pattern for downgrades.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
[ Table 2 ]
Next we show bank group descriptive statistics. Average assets of bank groups are Euro 2.28
billion. The dispersion of bank size is large. The 95th percentile of the bank assets is more than 14 times the 5th percentile. This suggests that we may have sufficient within savings bank variation in the use of soft information to assume that bank-borrower relations are of different strength, but we will test for whether large savings banks adjust the ratings of their customers 15 less based on soft information compared to small savings banks formally below. The number of direct competitors is less than one on average, indicating a rather low level of competition.
Merger activity was extensive during our sample period. On average, the savings bank groups were involved in a merger every third year.
Looking at further national control variables, the change in the ifo-index is on average positive, which reflects Germany's healthy economic phase in [2004] [2005] [2006] . The risk-free interest rate was on average 2.28% indicating low interest rate levels in Germany in the analyzed time period.
The average assets of the borrowers are Euro 616,000, which demonstrates that the savings banks mostly engage in SME lending.
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RESULTS
BORROWER SELF-SELECTION
As a first step, we check whether small savings banks deviate more from financial ratings than large savings banks. This would suggest that we indeed observe cross-sectional variation in the use of soft information in our sample. We present univariate results in Panel A of Table 3 . We split the borrowers according to their bank groups' average assets. The last column shows the tvalues of univariate regressions to test for differences of the smallest versus the largest savings banks. We find that the average absolute difference between financial rating and end rating, |Δ Rating|, is significantly higher for the smallest than for the largest savings banks. Smaller banks thus seem to use more discretion in lending than larger banks. This is consistent with the previous literature that smaller banks produce more soft information (Berger et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2012) . More importantly, the effect is not symmetric for upgrades and downgrades. A rating upgrade is 3.7% more likely for small than for large savings banks, which accounts to around 15% of the unconditional upgrade likelihood (see Table 2 ). In addition,
given they upgrade, the upgrade is by significantly more rating notches. In contrast, smaller banks do not use soft information to downgrade borrowers more often, nor do they downgrade by more notches compared to large banks. A rating downgrade is rather more likely for large than for small savings banks, however, the difference is not significant. Hence, we obtain first evidence for the hypothesis that borrowers with positive soft information self-select to smaller and more relationship oriented banks that are more likely to take this information into account.
[ Table 3 ]
Encouraged by the univariate results we now present some regressions. It is possible, for instance, that the univariate effects are due to regional differences across local markets. Panel B
of Table 3 shows regression results with the five different measures for discretion in lending as dependent variables and the bank size measure as the main independent variable. 16 The first column of Panel B shows that the absolute difference between the financial and the end rating, |Δ Rating|, is larger for smaller banks. As in the case of the univariate results, the effect is again not symmetric for upgrades and downgrades. Column 2 shows that smaller banks do seem to be significantly more likely to upgrade their borrowers based on soft information. In addition,
given they upgrade, the upgrade is by significantly more rating notches (column 4). In contrast, smaller banks do not use soft information to downgrade borrowers more often (column 3), nor do they downgrade by more notches compared to large banks (column 5). We thus find evidence in favor of the selection hypothesis: borrowers with positive soft information are more likely to obtain a loan from small relationship lenders, borrowers with negative soft information are not.
Control variables also offer interesting insights. As expected, larger borrowers are less likely to be upgraded and rating adjustments are smaller. 17 Larger borrowers tend to be less opaque, because reporting quality is better on average, and, hence, soft information is less important in their assessment for a loan. In addition, upgrades based on soft information are less likely in years with a merger between two (or more) savings banks, consistent with some loss of soft information of merged banks and the previous literature (see e.g. most recently Ogura and Uchida, 2012).
These results are important for two reasons. One, they relate our new proxies for the extent to which banks use soft information to bank size, which has been used in the previous literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2005; Cole et al., 2004) . Column 1 of Panel B shows that small banks use more discretion in lending. Second, columns 2 to 5 suggest that small banks use additional discretion to upgrade firms (i.e. to improve upon the rating they would have received based on financial information alone), but not to downgrade firms (i.e. to decrease the rating firms would have received based on financial information alone). This is consistent with a selection effect: firms with positive soft information self-select to small relationship banks that are more likely to take this information into account, while borrowers with negative soft information self-select to larger banks that do not take the soft information component into account. 18 We also find that larger banks tend to downgrade borrowers more often, although we do not obtain a statistically significant coefficient. We interpret this as tentative evidence that large banks attempt to take the selection effect into account by downgrading borrowers across the board.
FINANCIALLY RISKY AND OPAQUE BORROWERS
If firms with better soft information self-select towards smaller banks that are more likely to take soft information into account, is this effect stronger for firms with particularly weak 17 On the other hand, and to our surprise, they are more likely to be downgraded based on soft information than smaller borrowers. This finding is, however, not robust to using different size measures. These results are available from the authors upon request.
18 It is possible that loan officers of small banks use their discretion inefficiently to upgrade borrowers that provide loan officers with greater private benefits. This is investigated below.
financials? For firms with weak financials it should be particularly valuable if positive soft information is taken into account in the lending decision. We measure the extent of positive soft information by the upgrade probability, Upgrade, i.e. whether the bank improved the end rating compared to the financial rating. As a measure of the financial risk of a borrower we use the ZScore, which is decreasing in risk. In addition, in the regressions below we use the borrowers' financial rating. Both measures are strictly limited to financial characteristics and do not include soft information.
[ Table 4 ] Table 4 shows the univariate results. We split the matched bank borrower dataset into quartiles, sorted according to the borrowers' Z-Score. We use the firm's Z-Score instead of the financial rating, because it is independent of the bank's assessment of the borrower. The first row includes the riskiest borrowers, while the fourth row contains the safest borrowers. The first and second columns show the upgrade probability for the smallest and the largest bank size quartile.
Bank size is measured according to the sum of bank group assets in the respective year. We find that smaller banks are 3.7% more likely to upgrade their borrowers compared with larger banks (significant at the 10% level). This effect is more pronounced for the riskiest borrowers. The difference is 8.2% for the riskiest Z-Score quartile (significant at the 1% level) while the difference is only 2.0% for the safest Z-Score quartile (not significant). The differences-indifferences term is 6.2% and significant at the 1% level.
[ Table 5 ] Table 5 , columns I to IV, shows the regression results. 19 We regress Upgrade on borrower risk, bank size, local competition and the controls. We form interaction terms to capture the bank size-borrower risk relationship that we discovered in the univariate analysis. We report results for two measures of firms' financial risk: Z-Score and the financial rating. Specifically, the dummy variable Risky borrower equals 1 for borrowers in the riskiest Z-Score (financial rating) quartile and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables Small bank equals 1 for the smallest size quartile and 0 for the largest bank size quartile.
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Columns I and II show the individual effects or firm financial risk without interaction terms. We find that riskier borrowers are more likely to be upgraded due to positive soft information. The specification of columns III and IV also include the interaction term Risky borrower * Small bank. Smaller banks are 3.9% (that is -1.6% + 5.5%) more likely to upgrade ex ante financially risky borrowers compared to financially safe borrowers based on the Z-Score. The effect is even more pronounced for the financial rating. Both results are significant at the 1% level. Note that the unconditional probability to receive a rating upgrade is 24.5% (see Table 2 ). Concentrating on riskier borrowers, we find an economically and statistically significant effect since riskier borrowers in column 3 are 7.3% (that is 1.8% + 5.5%) more likely to receive a rating upgrade because of positive soft information at a small bank compared to the case of a risky borrower at a large bank. The effect is about the same magnitude if we use the financial rating to sort the borrowers in column 4. This result is in line with the idea that riskier borrowers (based on financial characteristics) who have substantial positive soft (private) information have a stronger incentive to apply for a loan with a bank that takes the soft information into account.
Selection would also predict that large banks should be more likely to adjust the rating of borrowers downward, because they are concerned that the borrowers with negative private soft information are particularly likely to apply for a loan at a large bank. This effect should be particularly strong for financially risky borrowers. In Panel B of Table 4 we show that this is indeed the case: The borrowers in the riskiest two quartiles of the distribution are 6-8 percentage points more likely to be downgraded by a large bank than by a small bank. The difference between the downgrade probability of safer borrowers between large and small banks is not significant, although negative. We concede, of course, that we cannot fully distinguish between the situation in which the large bank actually observes negative soft information versus that case that we have focused on, in which the bank simply downgrades because it cannot observe the private signal, but knows that it is likely to be negative, as those with positive signals would be better off getting credit from a relationship bank that can observe the signal.
[ Table 6 ]
To tackle the incentives to generate soft information from a different angle, we use the firms' legal form to distinguish between more and less opaque borrowers (Berger et al., 2005; Cole et al., 2004) . 20 Results are shown in Table 6 . Opaque borrowers are 6.5% more likely to receive a rating upgrade based on soft information (column 1). This individual effect is significant on the 1% level. Column 2 shows the interaction effect between bank size and opaqueness. We find that small banks are 3.4% more likely to upgrade opaque borrowers than large banks. This differential effect is significant at the 10% level.
Overall, we find a striking asymmetry: Small, relationship banks are much more likely to adjust the credit rating of borrowers upward. We observe the exact opposite for large, transaction banks, who are much more likely to adjust the credit rating of borrowers downward. Both of these effects are especially operative for firms that are financially risky and opaque. Hence, the investment in soft information of relationship banks is important for financially risky firms that have positive private information only available to the relationship bank, as they in the absence of relationship banks may be unable to obtain credit at the same terms.
BORROWER SELF-SELECTION AND COMPETITION
We next check whether the selection effect is related to local competition. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) argue that banks will invest less in the acquisition of (soft) information in more competitive markets, because they have to share rents with the borrowers. In contrast, the predictions in Boot and Thakor (2000) are more differentiated: While they acknowledge the existence of the effect of increased rent sharing with borrowers and they also argue that banks may invest more in gathering soft information in competitive markets in order to avoid direct price competition. We can investigate these arguments in our sample. We use data from the Bundesbank on the number of branches of other banks in the local market the savings bank operates in and define a dummy variable, High competition, that takes on the value of 1 if the bank operates in a market that is above median and 0 otherwise. We would then interpret a negative relationship between higher competition and Upgrade as a reduction in the investment of banks in the generation of soft information. We furthermore interact High competition with bank size to analyze whether relationship banks maintain their investment in soft information compared to transaction banks. In addition, we interact High competition with the borrowers' risk to check whether banks concentrate their investment in soft information for riskier borrowers.
In columns I and II of Table 5 we document an overall tendency to reduce investment into soft information in more competitive markets. We obtain negative coefficients on the individual High competition dummy variable as predicted by Hauswald and Marquez (2006) , although the coefficient is only statistically significant in column II. If banks invest less in information acquisition in more competitive markets that may suggest that financially risky firms with positive soft information may no longer be able to obtain credit in these markets. We investigate this issue in more detail by including two-way interaction terms between the competition level and bank size, and, in separate regressions, with borrower risk. First, we concentrate on the differential effect with respect to bank size. In Table 7 we show results, in which we check whether relationship banks adjust their investment in soft information differently from transaction banks. In column I we find that smaller banks are slightly more likely to upgrade borrowers in more competitive markets (0.5%, that is 1.8% -5.9% +4.6%) while large banks are less likely to do so (-5.9%). The difference between small and large banks is 6.4% and is significant at the 1% level. This difference is smaller for the financial rating in column II but still significant at the 5% level.
[ Table 7 ]
Second, we focus on the differential effect with respect to the borrowers' ex ante risk level. In columns III and IV of Table 7, we show results in which we analyze whether banks maintain their investment in soft information for financially riskier borrowers compared to financially safer borrowers. For the Z-Score as risk measure in column III, we find banks are more prone to upgrade riskier borrowers in competitive markets (2.4%, that is 1.1% -2.4% + 3.7%) while banks are less likely to upgrade safer borrowers in competitive markets (-2.4%). The difference is 4.8% and significant at the 1% level. The effect is even more pronounced when using the financial rating as a control in column IV of Table 5 .
In the last two columns of the table we analyze a bank's investments in soft information in more competitive markets by using three way interaction terms between competition, the financial risk of the borrower, and the size of the bank. That way, we are able to estimate the probability of a financially risky firm to receive an upgrade from a small bank in a competitive market.
Compared to a financially safe firm at a large bank in a competitive market, these firms are 9.3% more likely to receive an upgrade using Z-Score as a measure of financial risk in column
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V (significant at the 1% level). 21 For the financial rating as risk measure, the effect is again more pronounced and also highly significant (Table 7 , column VI).
Columns IV and V of Table 6 include the results for the interaction between the competition level and opaqueness. We find evidence that in highly competitive markets, opaque firms are 7.5% more likely to receive an upgrade than more transparent firms. The last column includes the three way interaction terms between competition, the opaqueness of the borrower, and the size of the bank. That way, we are able to estimate the probability of an opaque firm to receive an upgrade from a small bank in a competitive market. We find that in highly competitive markets, opaque firms at small banks are 11.6% more likely to receive an upgrade compared to more transparent firms at large banks. This effect is significant on the 1% level.
We thus find further support for our interpretation that smaller banks specialize on soft information production in more competitive markets; they not only do that for riskier firms (Table 7) but also for more opaque firms (Table 6 ). Hence, the selection effect of riskier and more opaque borrowers towards relationship banks is more pronounced in more competitive markets.
These results support the idea that in more competitive markets overall the generation of information is reduced. However, we also find evidence in favor of specialization in more competitive markets: larger banks reduce their investment in information, while small banks do not. Hence, the selection effect of financially riskier borrowers selecting towards relationship banks is even more pronounced in more competitive markets.
EX POST CREDIT OUTCOMES
Relationship banks lend to borrowers that exhibit ex ante weaker financial characteristics.
However, these borrowers tend to be upgraded based on positive soft information that transaction banks are unable to use. Next we examine whether this use of soft information results in overall riskier outcomes ex post. Clearly, if banks use the soft information in an unbiased way, the customers with ex ante weaker financial information may not necessarily exhibit higher probabilities to default ex post. On the other hand, if loan officers use the discretion to provide loans to borrowers that entail a private benefit to them or are otherwise captured by their customers, these borrowers would show a higher ex post default frequency compared to other borrowers. In order to differentiate between the two possibilities, we directly regress our proxy for the use of soft information on the default outcome of the borrower, which 21 We need to sum up all displayed coefficients in column V of Table 7 and to subtract -5.2%.
is either 1 in the case of a default in the following 12 months after the rating was assigned or 0 otherwise. Note that the unconditional default frequency is 4.8% (see Table 2 ).
[ Table 8 ] Table 8 shows results for this exercise. Glancing at the results in the table as a whole, most soft information proxies tend to obtain significant coefficients, which suggests that soft information seems to matter for predicting the borrowers' default, even conditioning on financial information. This is consistent with the previous literature Grunert et al., 2005) . The financial rating enters the regression significantly positively as expected, indicating that financially riskier borrowers are more likely to default.
22
In column I we see that |Δ Rating| obtains a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that if loan officers deviate from judging based on financial information alone, i.e. use soft information in their decision, these borrowers are more likely to default compared to those borrowers where loan officers only use financial information. This is evidence in favor of the idea that loan officers use their discretion to grant loans to customers that ex post turn out to be riskier compared to those where loan officers did not use such discretion. In column II, we distinguish between upgrades and downgrades. This permits a distinction between higher defaults because loan officers upgraded firms too much based on positive soft information and higher defaults because loan officers downgraded firms too little based on negative soft information. It turns out that if a firm was upgraded it is as likely to default as a borrower whose rating was not changed due to soft information (the coefficient is -0.003 and insignificant). In contrast, firms that were downgraded are 0.7% more likely to default (significant at the 1% level) relative to firms that received a loan purely based on financial information. If we compare firms that were upgraded to firms that were downgraded, we find that downgraded firms are 1% more likely to default relative to firms that were upgraded, controlling, as before, for the financial rating.
A similar picture emerges from the regression where we consider the strength of the upgrade and the strength of the downgrade, given the firm was upgraded or downgraded, respectively (columns III and IV of Table 8 ). Firms that received a higher upgrade (by more notches in the rating system) were significantly less likely to default (by 0.3%) and firms that received a stronger downgrade were significantly more likely to default (also by 0.3%). These results indicate that banks are too cautious in using soft information to adapt their view on the borrowers' credit risk that is formed by its financial characteristics. Ultimately, we thus do not find strong evidence for loan officers using soft information in a biased way.
In columns V to VIII of Table 8 we analyze whether the relation between soft information and default is stronger for borrowers with riskier financials. To ascertain this, we include interaction terms between the soft information proxy used and the borrowers' financial rating. The evidence is consistent with banks investing more in soft information where the pay-off may be greatest:
financially risky borrowers. Comparing upgraded and downgraded borrowers that are risky based on financials, we find that upgraded borrowers are 1.0% (that is 0.6% -1.1% -0.8% + 0.3%) less likely to default compared to downgraded risky borrowers (column VI). This difference is significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, borrowers that received a financial rating in the top three quartiles of the distribution and were upgraded are more likely to default ex post (0.6%). We interpret this evidence to suggest that banks invest in generating soft information about borrowers where the pay-off is largest, namely borrowers that have ex ante weak financial characteristics.
In further unreported regressions, we check the robustness of our results with subsamples for which two-year and three-year risk outcome measures (the maximum we can go with our data)
are available. This way we test the "evergreening" effect that banks have incentives to grant credit to their financially weakest borrowers in order to delay the borrowers' defaults and the realization of losses on their own balance sheets (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 2005) . In our setup, a biased use of soft information could be offset in the short run by evergreening, while becoming visible in the mid to long run. We thus use two-year and three-year default measures and still find that upgraded borrowers are significantly less likely to default than downgraded borrowers. We also test the potential reverse causality of discretion on the probability to default . While banks use soft information ex ante to predict defaults, the latter may become less likely if upgrades based on soft information increase access to credit and improve loan terms such as interest rates and maturity. We exclude borrowers that borrow exclusively from savings banks because any reverse causality bias should be less influential for the remaining firms with multiple lenders as the savings banks is only one of several banks in these cases. We find qualitatively unchanged results for this subsample. Reverse causality thus seems to play no role in explaining our findings of Table 8 . In addition, we split our sample with respect to the level of local bank competition. Results remain qualitatively unchanged in both samples.
ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS
We perform a number of robustness checks and extensions. One, we use different measures of banks size and account for non-linearities of the size of the bank in the investment in soft information. We also introduce time dummies in place of macro economic control variables. We furthermore check the relationship between savings bank (group) size and the level of local bank competition. Second, we examine whether political lending ahead of local elections may have driven our result of a higher probability of upgrades by small banks. And finally, we check whether larger banks indeed have lower cost per loan ratios.
We start with checking whether the selection result is robust to using different measures of bank size. For space limitations, we do not report these regressions, but they are available from the authors upon request. We find that using the number of bank branches or the number of bank employees yields qualitatively similar results in Section III. If we allow for non-linearities in size by using quartile dummies for bank size, we find that the banks in the largest size category use less soft information, are less likely to upgrade their borrowers, and if they upgrade, the upgrade is by a smaller magnitude. The effects are strongest for the largest bank quartile (versus the smallest quartile). This is consistent with the univariate results reported earlier. In further checks, we replace the macroeconomic controls (risk-free interest rate, change in ifo-Index) with year fixed effects. Our results are robust to these alternative specifications. We furthermore analyze the relationship between savings bank (group) size and the level of local bank competition to address concerns that our results may be driven by omitted regional characteristics. We apply a double sort on bank group size (quartiles) and the level of local bank competition (below and above the median). Table A1 in the appendix shows that there is no evidence that larger savings banks operate in more competitive markets. In particular, the largest banks are located in banking markets that exhibit below average competition.
Even though loans that benefited from a discretionary upgrade were not more likely to default, political lending could still drive part of our results. Smaller banks may be under larger political pressure in election years because they operate in smaller communities, which heavily rely on the savings banks' loan supply (political lending effect). For example, Dinç (2005) shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years in emerging markets relative to private banks. We add electoral data on Germany's state level for this analysis. Germany has an important legislative layer below the national level, which is organized on the state level.
Every four or five years, each of the 16 states has regional elections, which are not synchronized. 23 The data comes from the regional statistical offices.
Since for this test we do not rely on borrower level data we can use the individual savings banks' balance sheets and income statements for all 452 savings banks individually, rather than bank group data. By using this proprietary dataset, the sample size is larger than by using public sources such as Bankscope. In addition, it includes several non-publicly available data items as the number of mergers for each savings bank.
[ Table 9 ] Table 9 provides the results. 24 We regress the annual change in the commercial loan portfolio on bank size. The interaction term between bank size and the election variable (equals 1 if there was a state-wide election in the respective year, 0 otherwise) is the main variable of interest. If small banks exhibit stronger political lending, we would observe a negative interaction term, i.e.
smaller banks would increase their lending volume more in election years than larger banks would. In line with Dinç (2005), we find that commercial credit volume is increased in statewide election years. Concentrating on the interaction term between the dummy variable Election and the bank size measure (column 2), we find that credit volume is not expanded disproportionately by smaller banks in election years. Hence, we do not find evidence for particular political pressure on smaller banks to extend loan supply.
Next, we examine whether there are differences in costs between small and large banks in granting loans. Having an informational advantage by gathering soft information may go hand in hand with higher screening/monitoring costs at relationship banks (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) . Compared to transaction banks, margins and charter values may be lower at relationship banks, which may result in a greater willingness to accept riskier borrowers (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 2000) .
[ Table 10] 23 Local elections on the county/city level are often organized at the same dates as the state wide elections.
24 We use a sample with a longer time series (1996-2006 instead of 2002-2006) , as we do not rely on the rating data, which are available only for the shorter time period. We also estimated the model for 2002 to 2006 and also do not obtain a political lending effect. The results are available from the authors upon request.
We rely on three bank (group) level measures for costs per loan: i) sum of staff cost over average assets per bank group and year (in percent); ii) number of bank branches (in hundreds) over the average assets per bank group (in billions) and year; iii) number of bank FTEs (in thousands) over the average assets per bank group (in billions) and year. Table 10 shows the results for which we regress the three proxies on bank size (measured by the natural logarithm of bank assets). The bank size coefficient enters significantly in the regressions for all three proxies. We find that smaller banks have higher staff cost, use more branches and have more employees (per unit of assets). This is consistent with a cost advantage for large banks in screening/monitoring that they may use to offset the informational disadvantage and the associated selection problem. Unreported robustness checks, which are available from the authors on request, further include bank fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics. We also test whether the results in Table 10 are robust for non-linearities in size by using size quartile dummies. This should alleviate concerns about any mechanical correlation between ln(Bank assets) and the three dependent variables which use bank assets as denominator. The main results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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CONCLUSION
We start from the idea that soft information can be viewed as private information about a borrower that is observable to a relationship bank but not to a transaction bank (Inderst and Müller, 2007) , resulting in a Akerlof-type adverse selection effect: Firms with positive soft information optimally self-select to relationship banks, firms with negative soft information to transaction banks. Transaction banks therefore face disproportionately many borrowers with negative soft information and adjust their lending behavior accordingly. The interaction between relationship and transaction banks is also affected by the competitive environment, which from a theoretical perspective may result in more or less investment in gathering soft information by both types of banks.
We use a matched bank-borrower dataset of German savings banks that has three distinct advantages: One, we observe whether the lender used positive or negative soft information in the lending decision. Second, due to restrictions on the geographic operations of the banks in our sample, we can accurately measure their competitive environment. Third, we have information on borrower ex post defaults and therefore can check whether soft information was used efficiently.
Using these unique data, we are able to uncover two empirical results that to our knowledge have so far not been documented in the literature. One, we find that borrowers with riskier financial characteristics are more likely to obtain credit from relationship banks than from transaction banks if they have positive soft information. In contrast, financially riskier firms with negative soft information are more likely to turn to a transaction bank. This evidence supports adverse selection in the market for small business loans. Second, we show that competition affects relationship banks' and transaction banks' investment in gathering soft information asymmetrically. Relationship banks tend to increase their investment in gathering soft information, while transaction banks reduce it. An increase in competition results in a further specialization of banks, but does not necessarily reduce the overall investment in gathering soft information. Hence, interbank competition may not reduce the availability of credit to firms with weak financials but strong soft information, as some previous theory has suggested (e.g. Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) . All of these results are more pronounced for firms where soft information can ex ante to be expected to play a greater role in the lending decision: firms with weak financials and more opaque firms.
Further, our results suggest that discretion by loan officers is used efficiently in the sense that firms with upgrades in their rating based on soft information are not more likely to default than 30 other firms. Taking soft information into account may reduce credit constraints for financially weak or opaque firms. 
